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Farm earnings in Latin America have been depressed by pro-urban and anti-trade biases in 
national policies and by agricultural support policies of richer countries. These policies have 
reduced economic welfare, hampered trade and growth, and may well have added to income 
inequality. Since the 1980s, however, the region has reduced its sectoral and trade policy 
distortions;  and some high-income countries also have begun reducing market-distorting 
aspects of their farm policies. This paper synthesizes results from a World Bank project that 
provides: price-comparison based measures of the extent to which national policies have 
changed farmers’ price incentives; partial equilibrium indexes of the impact of farm policies 
on trade and economic welfare; general equilibrium estimates of trade, welfare and poverty 
effects of global reforms retrospectively and prospectively; comparisons with similar 
estimates for Asia, Africa and high-income countries; and a discussion of prospects for pro-




For decades, earnings from farming in Latin American countries have been depressed by a 
pro-urban bias in own-country policies, exchange rate controls, export taxes, and  by 
governments of richer countries favoring their farmers with import barriers and subsidies. As 
well, a considerable degree of sector differentiation in import restrictions has yielded a high 
differentiation in sectoral protectionism. These past policies have reduced national and global 
economic welfare, hampered agricultural trade and economic growth, and may well have 
added to income inequality and poverty in the region.  
From a peak in the distortionary levels in the mid 80s, however, the region has 
undergone reforms which have reduced in a large extent its sectoral and trade policy 
distortions, while some high-income countries also have begun reducing market-distorting 
aspects of their farm policies. Still, many trade-reducing price distortions remain between 
sectors, as well as within the agricultural sectors of most Latin American countries. 
This paper summarizes results from a recent World Bank research project that 
provides (a) price-comparison based measures of the extent to which national policies have 
changed farmers’ price incentives since the 1960s in 8 Latin American countries, (b) partial 
equilibrium indexes of the impact of national farm policy reforms on the volume of 
agricultural trade and on their economic welfare cost, and (c) general equilibrium estimates of 
national trade, welfare and poverty effects of global reforms since the early 1980s to 2004, 
which are compared with the projected effects of removing remaining distortions in 
agriculture and other goods markets, and further reform in regional policies.  
These results are part of a  global research project seeking to  improve our 
understanding of agricultural price and trade policy interventions and reforms in Asia, Africa, 
Europe’s transition economies, as well as Latin America and the Caribbean.
1
The Latin American sample involves eight countries, comprising the big four 
economies of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico; Colombia and Ecuador, two countries 
which rely to a great extent on agriculture; the Dominican Republic, the largest Caribbean 
economy; and Nicaragua, the poorest country in Central America. Together, in 2000–04, 
 The core of this 
project is a new set of annual time series estimates of assistance to and taxation of farmers 
over the past half century for 75 countries that together account for more than 90 percent of 
the world’s population and agricultural output (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008).  
                                                 
1 The regional studies are Anderson and Martin (2009), Anderson and Masters (2009), Anderson and Swinnen 
(2008), and Anderson and Valdés (2008). Together with comparable studies of high-income countries, they 
form the basis for a global overview volume (Anderson 2009).  
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these countries accounted for 78 percent of the region’s population, 80 percent of the region’s 
agricultural value added, and 84 percent of the total gross domestic product (GDP) of Latin 
America. 
  The key characteristics of these economies—which account for only 4.5 percent of 
worldwide GDP, but 7.7 percent of agricultural value added and more than 10 percent of 
agricultural and food exports—are shown in table 1. The table reveals the considerable 
diversity within the region in terms of stages of development, relative resource endowments, 
comparative advantages and, hence, trade specialization, and the incidence of poverty and 
income inequality. In particular, income inequality is high throughout the region compared 
with the rest of the world; the Gini coefficient is near or above 0.5 and averages 0.52. This is 
well above the Gini coefficient for Africa and Asia. Likewise, the Gini coefficient for land 
distribution is high in Latin America: 0.55 for Chile, but above 0.7 for Argentina, Brazil, 
Ecuador, and Nicaragua, compared with an average of less than 0.5 in Asia (World Bank 
2007). Even so, there is comparatively little absolute poverty except in the poorest tropical 
parts of the region. 
Though it relies on nearly twice as much agricultural land per capita as the rest of the 
world, Latin American agriculture is characterized by concentrated land ownership and a 
structure of production whereby medium and large commercial farms – even though small in 
number – contribute the bulk of agricultural output. It is also a region with a high degree of 
urbanization. These features are important in understanding the forces behind agricultural 
policies. So, too, is the fact that, until a few years ago, most countries in the region were 
experiencing a high degree of macroeconomic instability and high inflation. The 
manipulation of food prices for urban consumers in an attempt to reduce inflation was (and, 
in Argentina, still is) a dominant feature driving farm pricing policy. 
  Most Latin American countries have gone through a process of major economy-wide 
policy reforms, which began, for some countries, approximately in the mid-1980s (or the 
1970s for Chile) and, for others, in the mid-1990s. Reforms centered on macroeconomic 
stabilization, trade liberalization, deregulation, and some privatization (or abolition) of state 
agencies. There was a considerable reassessment of the role of government in guiding 
economic development. Agricultural policies were an integral part of this reform process, 
although not the principle motivation of the reforms. 
  This paper begins with a brief description of the evolution of agricultural and trade 
policies, then it is provided a short description of the methodology used by the authors of the 
individual  case  studies  to estimate the nominal rate of assistance (NRA)  to agricultural  
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producers, the corresponding consumer tax equivalent (CTE) facing domestic buyers of 
agricultural products, the relative rate of assistance (RRA) between the farm and nonfarm 
tradable sectors, partial-equilibrium indexes of trade and welfare, and general equilibrium 
estimates of national trade, welfare and poverty effects of global reforms retrospectively 
since the early 1980s and prospectively as of 2004.  A  synopsis of the empirical results 
showing the changing extent of price distortions is then provided for each country, and the 
continental averages are compared with those of Asia and Africa. The paper concludes by 
drawing  out implications  of the findings, including for poverty and inequality  and for 
possible future directions of policies affecting agricultural incentives in Latin America. 
 
The evolution of agricultural and trade policies 
From the late 1950s until approximately the mid-1980s, agricultural price interventions in the 
region were largely a by-product of a development strategy to encourage import-substitution 
industrialization. This policy also raised budgetary resources in the form of import tax 
revenue, which was supplemented in some countries through agricultural export taxes. Both 
sets of approaches harmed the region’s most competitive farmers and were offset only 
slightly by farm credit and fertilizer subsidies. 
From the late 1950s until early 1990s, there were concerns about high rates of 
inflation, especially where urban populations had strong political influence. Policy makers 
were under pressure to avoid large increases in food prices, which would potentially impact 
wage rates and thereby accelerate inflation. 
  In addition to fiscal and inflation objectives that made farm export taxes attractive, 
there was, in the 1950s and 1960s, a widespread belief among the region’s policy makers and 
followers of the structuralist school associated with Prebisch (1950, 1959, 1964), that the 
efficiency losses generated through the extraction of rents in agriculture were low and that the 
main impact would be to reduce land rents and land values. The prevailing view at the time 
was that farmers in Latin America were unresponsive to price incentives. While the belief in 
this unresponsiveness has now largely disappeared, a few countries—Argentina is one—still 
tax agricultural exports to generate fiscal revenues and lower consumer food prices. 
By the 1980s, there was disillusionment with the results of the import-substitution 
strategy and wider acceptance of theoretical developments regarding the causes of inflation 
and macroeconomic instability in general. During the 1980s and early 1990s, a 
macroeconomic framework designed for open economies gradually displaced the closed 
economy approach in most Latin American countries. Governments introduced economy- 
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wide reforms with special emphasis on macroeconomic stabilization, deregulation, unilateral 
trade liberalization, and privatization. 
  The goal of the reformers was to create a better climate for productivity and private 
investment in all economic sectors, including agriculture. In most Latin American countries, 
the major change in trade policy was the partial or total removal of most quantitative 
restrictions on imports and exports, the elimination of export taxes, and a program of gradual 
reduction in the levels of import tariffs. This yielded incentives to move resources from 
import-competing to export-oriented sectors, including in agriculture, which enhanced 
competitiveness and led to greater integration with the world economy, particularly for larger 
farmers. 
  By the mid-1990s, intervention in the foreign exchange markets was recognized as the 
most important “price distortion” affecting the agricultural economy. At the outset of the 
reforms, it was expected that trade liberalization and the reduction of the fiscal deficit would 
lead to a depreciation of the real exchange rate (Krueger, Schiff, and Valdés 1988, 1991; 
Valdés 1996). Yet, the reforms were followed by a significant appreciation of the currency 
that was associated with the opening of the capital account, greater inward foreign 
investment, and a major increase in domestic real interest rates. Reforms in the service sector 
also played a critical role. Deregulation and privatization had a major impact on the 
availability in the marketplace of the more-reliable and lower-cost services used in 
agriculture such as ports, airlines, and shipping transport. 
  The timing of reforms differed somewhat across countries. Colombia, for example, 
became a more open economy through export promotion beginning in 1967; it adopted a 
more ambitious liberalization of trade in 1990 and then went into a policy reform reversal 
beginning in 1992. 
  In Chile, the controlled markets of 1950 to 1974, accentuated during Allende’s land 
reform years (1971-73)  were followed by radical economic reforms toward trade 
liberalization, deregulation, and privatization between 1978 and 1982, before a second phase 
of reforms beginning in 1984. 
  Mexico introduced strong policy changes starting in the mid-1980s, before the signing 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement. The changes involved more openness, 
deregulation, and privatization, a reduction in credit subsidies, and major changes in the role 
of government in the marketing of farm products. 
  A wide variety of policy instruments have been applied to influence agricultural 
prices, even during the post-reform period. Colombia, for example, has had minimum support  
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prices, in addition to import tariffs, price compensation schemes, procurement agreements, a 
monopoly on grain imports by a government agency, export licenses and subsidies, and 
safeguards on imports; moreover, until 1990, all imports of inputs were subject to prior 
import licenses. Then, in 1995, tariffs and tariff surcharges associated with price bands on 
more than 100 products were introduced. 
  Mexico is another leader in interventions, including in the transition from highly 
government-controlled markets before the mid-1980s to more market-oriented policies. Its 
policies include price support programs (before the mid-1980s and in conjunction with state 
trading), credit and input subsidies, and direct income payments to farmers (ProCampo). 
  Argentina has simpler interventions. Agricultural exportables that are also wage 
goods have been subjected to export taxes, complemented by export bans in some years. The 
return to sizeable export taxes in late 2001 and their subsequent rises has been controversial, 
with the most recent rises leading to prolonged protests by farmers in urban areas in mid-
2008.  
 
The extent of distortions to agricultural incentives in Latin America 
a. Methodology: Quantifying the extent of distortions
2
To quantify government-imposed distortions that create a gap between domestic prices and 
what they would be under free markets, Anderson et al. (2008) suggest the first step is to 
compute the Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) for each farm product. This is the percentage 
by which government policies have raised gross returns to farmers above what they would be 
without the government’s intervention (or lowered them, if NRA<0). A weighted average 
NRA for all covered products can then be derived using the value of production at 
undistorted prices as weights.
  
3
                                                 
2 The methodology used here is similar to but not identical to that used by Krueger, Schiff, and Valdés (1991) 
and Valdés (1996). For a discussion of the differences in both the methodology and the estimates, see Anderson 
(2010). 
 This NRA is similar to the producer and consumer support 
estimates (PSEs and CSEs) computed by OECD (various years), except that the latter are 
expressed as a percentage of the distorted price. To that NRA for covered products is added a 
‘guesstimate’ of the NRA for non-covered products (on average around 30 pecent of the 
total) and an estimate of the NRA from non-product-specific forms of assistance or taxation. 
3 Our definition of a policy-induced price distortion follows Bhagwati (1971) and Corden (1997) and includes 
any policy measure at a country’s border (such as a trade tax or subsidy, a quantitative restriction on trade, or a 
dual or multiple foreign exchange rate system, or any domestic producer or consumer tax/subsidy/restraint on 
output, intermediate inputs or primary factors of production (except where needed to directly overcome an 
externality, or where it is set optimally across all products or factors, for example as a value added tax to raise 
government revenue).   
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Each farm industry is classified either as import-competing, or a producer of exportables, or 
as producing a nontradable (with its status sometimes changing over the years), so as to 
generate for each year the weighted average NRAs for the two different groups of covered 
tradable farm products. We also generate a production-weighted average NRA for 
nonagricultural tradables, for comparison with that for agricultural tradables via the 





t  and NRAnonag
t  are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the 
agricultural  (including non-covered)  and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.
4
In addition to the NRA, we also consider the extent to which consumers are taxed or 
subsidized. To do so, a Consumer Tax Equivalent (CTE) is computed as the percentage by 
which the price that consumers pay for their food exceeds the international price of each food 
product at the border. Differences between the NRA and the CTE can arise from distortions 
in the domestic economy that are caused by transfer policies and taxes/subsidies that cause 
the prices paid by consumers (adjusted to the farmgate level) to differ from those received by 
producers; but in the absence of such differences, the CTE for each tradable farm product is 
assumed to be the same as the NRA from border distortions and the CTE for nontradable 
farm products is assumed to be zero.   
  Since the 
NRA cannot be less than -100 percent if producers are to earn anything, neither can the RRA 
(since the weighted average NRAnonag
t is non-negative in all our country case studies). And 
if both of those sectors are equally assisted, the RRA is zero. This measure is useful in that if 
it is below (above) zero, it provides an internationally comparable indication of the extent to 
which a country’s sectoral policy regime has an anti- (pro-)agricultural bias.  
 
b. Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture  
On average, agricultural price and trade policies in Latin America reduced farmer earnings in 
the postwar period through to the 1980s. The extent (when expressed as a nominal tax 
equivalent) peaked at more than 20 percent in the 1970s, but still averaged close to 10 percent 
in the later 1980s (table 2). The only focus countries in our sample that received positive 
assistance from farm policies during that period were Chile and (at least from the late 1970s, 
                                                 
4  Farmers are affected not just by prices of their own products but also by the incentives nonagricultural 
producers face. That is, it is relative  prices and hence relative  rates of government assistance that affect 
producer incentives. More than seventy years ago Lerner (1936) provided his Symmetry Theorem that proved 
that in a two-sector economy, an import tax has the same effect as an export tax. This carries over to a model 
that also includes a third sector producing only nontradables. For a clear non-technical exposition of this 
important insight from theory of relevance to Latin America, see Clements and Sjaastad (1984).  
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but only to a minor extent) Mexico and Colombia. Argentina, Brazil, the Dominican 
Republic, and Ecuador each had negative rates of assistance that averaged well above 20 
percent for at least one five-year period, and, apart from the Dominican Republic, each had a 
negative average NRA even in the 1990s, as did Nicaragua. However, by the mid-1990s, 
Brazil and the Dominican Republic had joined Chile and Colombia in that they had positive 
average NRAs. Meanwhile, Mexico had raised its assistance considerably before engaging in 
reform following negotiations to join the World Trade Organization and the North American 
Free Trade Agreement, while Argentina had all but eliminated its discrimination against its 
exporters in the 1990s, only to reinstate explicit export taxes again in late 2001 when it 
abandoned its fixed exchange rate with the U.S. dollar and nominally devalued its currency 
by two-thirds.  
The average NRA for all agriculture for the region in the 1990s and the first half of 
the present decade was slightly positive, at around 5 percent (figure 1). The strong antitrade 
bias of the past has diminished somewhat but is still evident in figure 1 , which shows the 
average NRAs for agriculture’s import-competing and export subsectors in the region.  
  According to the new study’s estimates, there are relatively few significant domestic 
producer subsidies or taxes in the region. The main exceptions are positive domestic support 
measures in Mexico and slightly negative measures in Argentina.  Non-product-specific 
assistance accounts to only one or two percentage points during the past four decades. Input 
price distortions have also contributed little, on average, to the overall regional NRA in 
agriculture, reducing the negative value slightly in the 1980s and adding slightly to the 
positive value during the past decade or so. 
 
(c) Assistance to nonfarm sectors and the RRA 
The anti-agricultural policy bias of the past was caused not only by agricultural policies but 
also by sectoral policies affecting industrial activities. The significant reduction in border 
protection for the manufacturing sector and the indirect impact of this on the drop in the price 
of nontradables after the initiation of the reforms, together with the deregulation and 
privatization of services, also  have been important influences  on  incentives affecting 
intersectorally mobile resources. The reduction in assistance to nonfarm tradable sectors may 
have been as responsible for the expansion in agricultural exports since the early 1990s as the 
reduction in direct taxation on these agricultural exports. 
  Quantifying this distortion in nonfarm tradable sectors as accurately as the 
quantification of the distortion in agriculture has not been possible. National  case  study  
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authors have had to rely on applied trade taxes (for exports, as well as imports) rather than 
undertaking price comparisons for all nonfarm goods, and, hence, they have not captured the 
quantitative restrictions on trade that were important in earlier decades but that have been less 
important recently. Nor have they captured distortions in the services sectors; many of these 
sectors now produce tradables (or would do so in the absence of interventions preventing the 
emergence of this production). As a result, the NRAs for nonfarm importables are 
underestimated, and the decline indicated is less rapid than the decline that actually occurred. 
The situation is similar for nonfarm exportables, except that the actual NRAs would have 
been negative in most cases. Of these two elements of underestimation, the former bias 
probably dominated. Thus, the  case study  authors’  estimates of the overall NRA for 
nonagricultural tradables should be considered as lower-bound estimates; this is especially 
true as we go back in time, so that the decline indicated by the NRA is less rapid than it 
actually was.
5
  Despite these methodological limitations, the estimated NRAs for nonfarm tradables 
prior to the 1990s are sizeable. For Latin America as a whole, the average value of the NRAs 
for nonfarm tradables has steadily declined throughout the past four decades as policy 
reforms have spread. This has therefore contributed to a decline in the estimated RRA among 
farmers. Thus, the RRA has fallen from more than  −30 percent in the 1970s to an average of 
almost zero in 2000–04 (see table 3), and this appears to have been caused as much by falling 
positive NRAs among nonfarm producers as by falling negative NRAs among farmers (in 
figure 2). The extent of the change in RRAs among individual countries over the past two 
decades is striking, particularly in the case of Brazil and the Dominican Republic (the virtual 
disappearance of negative RRAs) and of Colombia (a switch from negative to positive 
RRAs).  
  
Similar estimates of distortion have been undertaken for Asia and Africa, making it 
possible to compare the extent of reforms in Latin America with those other developing 
country regions. Figure 3 summarizes those findings (see Anderson 2009, Ch. 1 for details). 
It reveals that Latin American countries have reformed considerably more than countries in 
Africa, and like Asia they now have an average RRA of close to zero. However, apparently 
its policy regimes were not as negative towards farmers as those of Asia during the final one-
third of the 20
th century.  
                                                 
5 This bias is accentuated in those cases where distortions to exchange rates are not included. Exchange rate 
distortions have been included only in the studies on the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, and 
these economies are too small for their inclusion to affect noticeably the weighted average NRAs and RRAs for 




(d) Consumer tax equivalents of agricultural policies 
The extent to which farm policies impact on the retail consumer price of food and on the 
price of livestock feedstuffs depends on a wide range of factors, including the degree of 
processing undertaken and the extent of competition along the value chain. We therefore 
attempt only to examine the importance of the impact of policies on the buyer’s price at the 
level where the farm product is first traded internationally and, hence, where price 
comparisons are made.
6
  If there were no farm input distortions and no domestic output price distortions such 
that the NRA was entirely the result of border measures such as an import or export tax, then 
the CTE would equal the NRA for each covered product. Because the behind-the-border 
distortions are relatively minor in Latin America, and because the NRA tended to be positive 
for import-competing products and  negative for exportables until recently, the  weighted 
average CTE for the region has thus been negative for most of the period. It averaged around 
−15 percent until the 1990s and was marginally above zero thereafter (table 4).  
  
 
Partial equilibrium indexes of trade and welfare effects of national farm policies  
 
What impact have these distortions had over time on trade and national economic welfare? 
One way to indicate the impact of the distortions to covered farm products has been 
suggested by Anderson and Neary (2005), who developed a family of so-called trade 
restrictiveness indexes. More recently Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2009) have built on that 
family of indexes for situations (as in agriculture) where there are differences between 
consumer and producer price distortions. Their trade (or welfare) reduction index, TRI (or 
WRI), makes use of the above NRA and CTE estimates for each farm product to answer the 
question: what ad valorem trade tax, if applied uniformly to all farm products, would provide 
the same reduction in national agricultural trade (economic welfare) as the current structure 
of NRAs and CTEs? An important aspect of the WRI in particular is that it takes into account 
that the welfare cost of a price-distorting policy measure is proportional to the square of the 
NRA for that measure.  
                                                 
6 The consumer tax at the retail level is probably smaller in percentage terms but larger in value terms, because 
of the addition of marketing margins in the processing, distribution and retail parts of the value chain. To obtain 
weights to make it possible to sum up across commodities and countries, we calculate the volume of apparent 
consumption simply as production plus net imports and then value the result at undistorted prices.     
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Estimates of these TRIs and WRIs, which have the virtue of being comparable across 
countries and over time, are reported in table 5. Since the mid-1980s they have declined 
considerably for Brazil and Chile, and also for Argentina and Ecuador until recent reversals. 
For the region as a whole, its time path for these indicators again has followed Asia’s and 
been more substantial than in Africa. 
 
Computable general equilibrium modeling of effects of price and trade policies 
 
While the above indexes of trade and welfare reduction offer very useful indications over 
time of how much agricultural price and trade policies have been distorting national farm 
sectors, they are nonetheless only partial in the sense that reforms to policies in other sectors 
–  which may have an indirect effect on farmer incentives –  are not taken into account. 
Furthermore, there is an interest in numerous other economic consequences beyond national 
agricultural trade and economic welfare. And with reforms going on elsewhere in the world 
at the same time as Latin America has been reforming its policies, what are the net effects on 
Latin America of this global reform movement?  
To satisfy such  additional interests  and questions,  the best available economic 
assessment tool is a global economy-wide model.  For most of this decade, the World Bank 
has been using a global computable general equilibrium model known as LINKAGE (van der 
Mensbrugghe 2005) to form the basis for the World Bank’s standard long-term projections of 
the world economy and for much of its trade policy analysis (see, e.g., World Bank 2002, 
2004, 2005, 2006).Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugghe and Anderson (2009) recently used that 
model first to quantify the net economic effects of trade-related policy changes globally since 
the early 1980s to 2004, and then to compare them with prospective effects of removing 
remaining policy distortions to global goods markets. While no-one anticipates a move to 
completely free markets globally in the near future, the comparison with the 1980-84 results 
provides a sense of perspective on what is still in prospect relative to what the world has 
already been through in terms of policy changes over the past quarter century. The 
prospective analysis also serves as a benchmark to suggest what is at stake in terms of further 
reforms via WTO rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. At the same time, by showing 
how different the trade patterns of various countries would be without distortion, such results 
also provide a better indication of agricultural comparative advantages in different parts of 
the world than is available by looking at actual trade and self-sufficiency indicators in the 
current distortion-ridden situation.    
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The LINKAGE model is a relatively straightforward CGE model, in which factor stocks 
are fixed, producers minimize costs subject to constant returns to scale production 
technology, consumers maximize utility, and all markets are cleared with flexible prices. 
There are three types of production structures. Crop sectors reflect the substitution 
possibilities between extensive and intensive farming; livestock sectors reflect the 
substitution possibilities between pasture and intensive feeding; and all other sectors reflect 
standard capital/labor substitution. There are two types of labor, skilled and unskilled. There 
is a single representative household per modeled region, allocating income to consumption 
using the extended linear expenditure system. Trade is modeled using a nested Armington 
structure in which aggregate import demand is the outcome of allocating domestic absorption 
between domestic goods and aggregate imports, and then aggregate import demand is 
allocated across source countries to determine the bilateral trade flows.
7
The model is calibrated to 2004 using the pre-release of Version 7 of the GTAP 
global protection database (see 
 
www.gtap.org). This is amended by replacing its agricultural 
distortions for developing countries (which are mostly based on applied tariff rates only) with 
NRAs and CTEs that reproduce those estimated, using domestic-to-border price comparisons, 
by authors of the developing country case studies in the World Bank project, as compiled by 
Valenzuela and Anderson (2008). Valenzuela and Anderson also provide a set of distortions 
for the period 1980-84, again aiming to reproduce trend distortion rates in the country case 
studies. Both periods’ distortions are summarized for Latin American countries and other 
regions in table 6. 
Several key findings from the global economy-wide modeling study by Valenzuela, 
van der Mensbrugghe and Anderson (2009) are worth emphasizing. First, the model estimates 
that policy reforms from the early 1980s to 2004 improved developing country economic 
welfare by $73 billion per year, and that removing the distortions remaining as of 2004 would 
add another $65 billion per year. This suggests that, in a developing country welfare sense, 
the world had moved nearly half of the way towards freeing up goods trade over that quarter 
                                                 
7  In terms of model closure, government fiscal balances are fixed, with the fiscal objective being met by 
changing the level of lump sum taxes on households. This implies that losses of tariff revenues are replaced by 
higher direct taxes on households. The current account balance also is fixed. Given that other external financial 
flows are fixed, this implies that ex ante changes to the trade balance are reflected in ex post changes to the real 
exchange rate. For example, if import tariffs are reduced, the propensity to import increases and additional 
imports are financed by increasing export revenues. The latter typically is achieved by a depreciation of the real 
exchange rate. Finally, investment is driven by savings. With fixed public and foreign saving, investment comes 
from changes in the savings behavior of households and from changes in the unit cost of investment. The model 
only solves for relative prices, with the numéraire, or price anchor, being the export price index of manufactured 
exports from high-income countries. This price is fixed at unity in the base year.  
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century. For Latin America, the corresponding welfare gains are $7.1 and $15.8 billion per 
year (table 7). Since the Latin American region represents barely one-tenth of the population 
of developing countries, its per capita gains were similar to those for other developing 
country regions during the past quarter-century, and would be (1/10
th of 15.8/65 =) 2.4 times 
greater if the policies as of 2004 were to be removed. This is largely because 60 percent of 
those prospective welfare gains from global liberalization would come from agricultural and 
food policy reforms.  
Second, the share of global farm production exported (including intra-EU trade) in 
2004 was slightly smaller as a result of those reforms since 1980-84 (11.4 instead of 13.1 
percent), because of less farm export subsidies (table 8). Agriculture’s 11 percent share in 
2004 contrasts with three times that for other primary products and more than twice that for 
all other goods – a ‘thinness’ that is an important contributor to the volatility of international 
prices for weather-dependent farm products. If the policies distorting goods trade in 2004 
were removed, the share of global production of farm products and food that is exported 
would rise from 11.4 to 15.4 percent, thereby reducing instability of prices and quantities of 
those products traded. This would benefit Latin America especially, given that agriculture 
and food products are 2.2 times more important to its exports than to the rest of the world’s 
exports. 
Third, the developing countries’ share of the world’s primary agricultural exports rose 
from 43 to 55 percent, and its farm output share from 58 to 62 percent, because of those 
reforms, with rises in nearly all agricultural industries except rice and sugar. Removing 
remaining goods market distortions would boost their export and output shares to 64 and 65 
percent, respectively. Because of the importance of farm products in the exports of Latin 
America, it enjoys exceptionally large proportions of those developing country share gains.  
Fourth, the  average real price in international markets for agricultural and food 
products would have been 13 percent lower had policies not changed over the quarter century 
to 2004. Evidently the impact of reforms in high-income countries (including the cuts in farm 
export subsidies) in raising international food prices more than offset the opposite impact of 
reforms (including the cuts in agricultural export taxes) in developing countries over that 
period. By contrast, removing remaining distortions as of 2004 is projected to raise the 
international price of agricultural and food products by less than 1 percent on average (Table 
9). This is contrary to earlier modeling results based on the GTAP protections database (e.g. 
those in Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006) which suggested they would rise 
by 3.1 percent or, for just primary agriculture, by 5.5 percent). The lesser impact in these new  
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results is because export taxes in developing countries based on the above NRA estimates are 
included in the new database (most notably for Argentina) whose removal would offset the 
international price-raising effect of eliminating import protection and farm subsidies 
elsewhere.  
Fifth, accompanying the price changes are changes in output, exports and imports of 
farm products. For Latin America, output would have been about 7 percent lower and exports 
21 percent lower in 2004 had the reforms after the early 1980s not taken place, compared 
with just 3 percent lower and 5 percent higher for other developing countries, respectively. 
However, while farm output would increase even more  in  Latin America if remaining 
distortions as of 2004 were removed (by 27 percent), they would increase by only 7 percent 
in other developing countries on average. For the world as a whole, these results suggest farm 
trade would have been two-thirds bigger in real value terms had the past two decades of 
reform not occurred. On the export side that is almost entirely due to high-income countries, 
whose exports would have been more than twice as large had they not lowered their export 
subsidies and developing countries not lowered their export taxes. If the distortions as of 
2004 were removed, global trade would be boosted by two-fifths (table 10). 
Sixth,  for developing countries as a group, net farm income (value added in 
agriculture) would have been 5 percent lower without the reforms of the quarter century to 
2004,  and 10 percent lower in Latin America, which is many times more than the 
proportional gains for non-agriculture. If policies remaining in 2004 were removed, net farm 
incomes would rise a further 37 percent for Latin America and 6 percent for all developing 
countries, compared with just 2 percent for non-agricultural value added (table 11). As well, 
returns to unskilled workers in developing countries – the majority of whom work on farms – 
would rise more than returns to other productive factors from that liberalization. In Latin 
America that is also true except for land rents, which are affected even more positively than 
unskilled labor. Together, these findings suggest both inequality and poverty globally could 
be alleviated by such reform, given that three-quarters of the world’s poor are in farm 
households in developing countries (Chen and Ravallion 2008); but in Latin America 
inequality reforms may have increased inequality in so far as agricultural land is still owned 
by the wealthy.  
 




The most salient feature of price and trade policies in the Latin American region since the 
1960s is the major economic reforms, including significant trade liberalization, in most 
countries during the later 1980s and early 1990s. Overall levels of nonagricultural protection 
have declined considerably, most significantly in the industrial sector, and there have been 
reforms in the service sector (deregulation and privatization). Both changes have improved 
the competitiveness of the agricultural sector. By way of summarizing the key findings, the 
following features of the Latin American experience of the past 40 or more years are worth 
highlighting.  
  The region has seen a gradual movement away from the taxation of farmers relative 
to nonagricultural producers since the 1970s, and the emergence of positive assistance for 
agriculture since the early 1990s. The gradual fall in the estimated (negative) RRA for the 
region, from as high as  −40 percent in the early 1970s to le ss than  −2 percent in the past 
decade, has not been dissimilar to trends in Africa and Asia, but is nonetheless dramatic. 
Instead of being effectively taxed nearly US$17 billion per year, as occurred in the 1980s (or 
US$400 per person working in agriculture), farmers in the region now enjoy support worth 
more than US$5 billion per year, or nearly US$125 per person employed on farms. An 
exception is Argentina, where there was a reversal of policy reform that involved a step back 
to direct export taxation in late 2001, though this has to be seen in the context of the massive 
devaluation in Argentina at that time when the country abandoned the fixed parity with the 
U.S. dollar. Thanks to the devaluation, Argentina continued to contribute to the rapid growth 
of Latin America’s share in the global exports of farm products that was stimulated by the 
gradual elimination of anti-agricultural policies. 
  The dispersion across Latin America in average NRAs and RRAs for farmers has not 
diminished much despite the reforms in all countries, nor has the dispersion in NRAs among 
farmers within each Latin American country including a strong antitrade bias in assistance 
rates. This means there is still lots of scope for reducing distortions in the region’s use of 
resources in agriculture. This finding also indicates that political economy forces are at work 
in each country and that these are not changing greatly relative to the situation in other 
countries over time.  
  Because the agricultural taxation or assistance is mostly due to trade measures, 
movements in the CTE closely replicate changes in farm support or taxation, which means 
that, before the reforms, food prices were kept artificially low, but, in recent years, they have 
been above international levels on average. It also means there is considerable variation in  
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CTEs across products and across countries in the region. The CTEs (like the NRAs) are 
highest for milk, rice, and sugar, but are negative, on average, for maize, beef, and soybeans.  
  The decline in negative RRAs  has been caused as much by cuts in protection in 
nonagricultural sectors as by reforms in agricultural policies. This underscores the fact that 
the reductions in distortions in agricultural incentives in the region have been part of a series 
of economy-wide reform programs and have not been caused merely by farm policy reforms. 
  The recent and prospective reforms have benefitted unskilled workers in the region 
but have benefitted landholders even more. That suggests domestic income and wealth re-
distribution policies may need to be adjusted in Latin America if reforms are  to not 
exacerbate inequality in the region.
8
The assistance trends are encouraging in that they signal  the long period of 
encouraging import substitution in the industrial sector and of taxing primary exports, which 
so heavily discriminated against the agricultural sector in Latin America, has been largely 
relegated to history. However, as the above summary makes clear, this does not mean that 
policies are no longer distorting agricultural incentives. And, if Latin America were to follow 
the policy path chosen by more-advanced economies that involves increasing agricultural 
assistance as per capita incomes rise, there may be even more distortion in the future. This 
suggests that vigilance will be needed among economic policy advisors in the years to come. 
Meanwhile, the opposite policy problem remains in Argentina, where explicit export taxation 
was reintroduced in late 2001 and has been increased a number of times since then. 
  
  Trade taxes, whether on agricultural imports to reduce import competition for the 
benefit of poor farmers, or on agricultural exports to lower the cost of food for the urban 
poor, are not the most efficient way to reduce poverty (Winters, McCulloch, and McKay 
2004). Trade policy instruments are almost never the first-best way to reduce poverty. On the 
contrary, food trade taxes may even worsen poverty, depending on the earning and spending 
patterns of poor households and on the alternative tax-raising instruments available. Far more 
preferable would be microeconomic reforms to mitigate the deep-seated structural problems 
affecting the competitiveness of factor and goods markets. This is because the reforms have 
accentuated the differences between commercially oriented farmers and farmers who are less 
prepared to take advantage of economic reform. Although countries have adopted various 
policies to mitigate the human costs of economic adjustment (especially since the mid-
                                                 
8 A recent study by Valdés et al. (2008, Table 2, p. 86) suggests that since 1990 the earnings of landholders have 
gone down in Brazil, Chile and Mexico. That is not inconsistent with the above modeling result, which is from a 
‘what if …’ simulation that shows how factor prices would have changed from policy reforms since the early 
1980s if nothing else changed over that period.   
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1990s), there were in some cases adverse effects on rural poverty and traditional agriculture 
was often left behind (Spoor 2000; Valdés and Foster 2007). Many countries in the region 
have implemented safety net programs to aid all poor, including direct income transfers and 
conditional cash transfers to families in agriculture. The challenge for the years ahead is to 
improve the coverage and effectiveness of poverty alleviation programs. Such programs are 
not only good in fighting poverty, but can contribute to investments in human capital and can, 
by  acting  as a form of guaranteed  compensation,  reduce political obstacles to further 
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Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, import-competing and all agricultural products,  
Latin America region, 1965 to 2004 
(Percent, weighted average across countries) 

















Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural and non-agricultural tradable products  
and relative rate of assistance, Latin America region, 1965 to 2004
 a 

















Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on estimates reported in Anderson and Valdés (2008).  
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Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on estimates reported in Anderson (2009). 
a 5-year weighted averages with value of production at undistorted prices as weights. In Asia, estimates for 
China pre-1981 are based on the assumption that the nominal rate of assistance to agriculture in those earlier 























Key economic and trade indicators, Latin America and other regions, 2000-2004 



































countries  6.49  4.49  7.73  69  178  219  0.42  7  52 
Argentina  0.61  0.54  1.04  89  426  541  0.85  5  51 
Brazil  2.88  1.54  3.38  54  184  355  0.66  8  57 
Chile  0.25  0.22  0.24  86  120  386  0.63  2  55 
Colombia  0.70  0.24  0.77  35  132  264  0.25  7  59 
Dominican Rep  0.14  0.06  0.18  41  54  474  0.29  3  52 
Ecuador  0.20  0.07  0.16  33  80  487  0.59  16  44 
Mexico  1.62  1.82  1.89  112  133  64  -0.17  7  46 
Nicaragua  0.08  0.01  0.06  14  169  952  0.26  44  43 
Other LA 
countries  1.84  0.84  2.05  46  148  na  na  na  na 
All Latin America  8.33  5.33  9.78  64  171  na  na  na  na 
Africa  11.71  1.67  6.04  14  148  na  na  32  na 
Asia (ex. Japan)  50.76  10.37  36.65  20  34  80  -0.03  19  36 
Western Europe  6.31  28.66  15.43  454  46  106  -0.03  na   
United States and 
Canada  5.14  32.67  10.82  636  186  119  0.08  na  40 
Australia and New 
Zealand  0.38  1.54  1.57  405  2454  354  0.62  na  35 
Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2007), compiled mainly from World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. 
a Revealed comparative advantage index is the share of agriculture and processed food in national exports as a 
ratio of that sector’s share of global exports.  
b Primary agricultural trade specialization index is net exports as a ratio of the sum of exports and imports of 
agricultural and processed food products (world average =0.0). 
c Percentage of the population living on less than US $1 per day. 
d The poverty incidence and Gini index are for the most recent year available between 2000 and 2004, except for 






Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture, Latin America and other regions, 1965 to 2004
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1994  1995-99  2000-
2004 
Argentina  -22.7  -22.9  -20.4  -19.3  -15.8  -7.0  -4.0  -14.9 
Brazil
c  -6.1  -27.3  -23.3  -25.7  -21.1  -11.3  8.0  4.1 
Chile  16.2  12.0  4.5  7.2  13.0  7.9  8.2  5.8 
Colombia  -4.7  -14.8  -13.0  5.0  0.2  8.2  13.2  25.9 
Dominican Republic  5.0  -17.5  -21.2  -30.7  -36.4  -1.0  9.2  2.5 
Ecuador
c  -9.6  -22.4  -15.0  5.9  -1.0  -5.3  -2.0  10.1 
Mexico  na  na  na  2.9  3.0  30.8  4.2  11.6 
Nicaragua
c  na  na  na  na  na  -3.2  -11.3  -4.2 
LA focus countries 
a  -7.2  -21.0  -18.0  -12.5  -10.9  4.2  5.5  4.8 
Africa  -11.3  -14.7  -12.7  -7.9  -1.0  -8.9  -5.7  -7.3 
Asia (excl. Japan)  -25  -25  -24  -21  -9  -2  8  12 
Western Europe  68  46  56  74  82  64  44  37 
U.S. and Canada  11  7  8  13  19  16  11  17 
Australia and N. Zealand  10  8  8  11  9  4  3  1 
Developing countries  -22  -24  -22  -18  -8  -2  6  9 
High-income countries  35  25  32  41  53  46  35  32 
All focus countries   6  0  2  5  17  18  17  18 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on estimates reported in Anderson and Valdés (2008). 
a  Weighted average for each country, including product-specific input distortions and non-product specific 
assistance as well as authors’ guesstimates for non-covered farm products, with weights based on gross value of 
agricultural production at undistorted prices. 





Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural industries,  
Latin American region, 1965 to 2004 
(Weighted averages for 8 focus countries, percent) 
   1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04 
NRA, covered products
a  -13.0  -25.1  -19.6  -14.6  -14.3  0.9  0.8  2.7 
NRA, non-covered 
products  -3.3  -15.5  -15.0  -10.9  -13.1  0.7  3.8  2.1 
NRA, all agric. 
products
a  -8.6  -21.7  -18.1  -13.6  -14.0  0.8  1.7  2.5 
Total agricultural 
NRA (incl. NPS)
b  -7.2  -21.0  -18.0  -12.5  -10.9  4.2  5.5  4.8 
NRA, just tradables:                 
   All agricultural 
tradables
b  -9.3  -23.0  -19.0  -12.9  -11.2  4.4  5.5  4.9 
   All non-agricultural 
tradables  15.9  27.8  23.3  18.5  16.8  7.3  6.6  5.5 
Relative rate of 
assistance, RRA
c  -21.4  -39.8  -34.2  -26.6  -24.0  -2.7  -1.0  -0.6 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on estimates reported in Anderson and Valdés (2008). 
a NRAs including product-specific input subsidies.  
b  NRAs including non-product-specific (NPS) assistance, that is, the assistance to all primary  factors and 
intermediate inputs as a percentage of the total primary agricultural production valued at undistorted prices. 
c  RRA is defined as 100*[(100+NRAag
t)/(100+NRAnonag
t)-1], where NRAag
t  and NRAnonag
t  are the 





Percentage consumer tax equivalent of policies affecting covered farm products,  
Latin American countries, 1965 to 2003
 a 


















Argentina  -27.6  -27.2  -25.2  -23.4  -16.6  -5.7  0.0  -9.1 
Brazil  2.1  -25.4  -19.8  -25.8  -26.5  -23.1  -2.1  -1.3 
Chile  7.1  1.5  2.8  9.0  23.8  18.1  14.2  10.7 
Colombia  7.2  -13.4  -5.3  27.4  20.8  16.2  33.9  49.7 
Dominican Rep.  12.9  -7.1  -7.7  -27.8  -31.4  7.8  16.6  3.5 
Ecuador  -10.5  -25.7  3.9  35.0  17.4  -3.3  4.6  18.5 
Mexico  na  na  na  -1.3  0.8  22.3  -1.9  9.9 
Nicaragua  na  na  na  na  na  10.5  10.6  9.0 
 
  LA focus countries 
(weighted average)
b  -4.7  -22.1  -16.2  -13.4  -12.3  -2.7  1.4  5.1 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Anderson and Valdés (2008). 
a Assumes the CTE is the same as the NRA derived from trade measures (that is, not including any input 
taxes/subsidies or domestic producer price subsidies/taxes).  
b  Weights are consumption valued at undistorted prices, where consumption (from FAO) is  estimated as 







Trade and Welfare Reduction Indexes, by country and region,
a all covered tradable farm products,  
1960 to 2004 
(In percentage) 
(a) Trade Reduction Indexes 
   1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04 
                   
Argentina  30  27  28  25  23  18  7  3  13 
Brazil  na  12  28  19  20  13  11  0  0 
Chile  9  -7  -15  4  8  24  17  14  8 
Colombia  14  5  8  8  18  11  5  12  -13 
Dominican 
Republic  60  25  21  27  37  34  57  30  37 
Ecuador  na  12  15  34  45  26  3  7  16 
Mexico  na  na  na  12  16  13  26  8  17 
Nicaragua  na  na  na  na  na  na  11  22  18 
                   
Latin America  22  8  19  17  19  13  23  7  8 
Africa  32  33  33  34  18  54  17  16  22 
Asia  15  28  23  28  34  28  18  8  6 
Developing 
countries  26  27  27  28  28  29  21  9  10 
Europe’s 
transition econs.  na  na  na  na  na  na  -4  13  14 
High-income 
countries  19  9  16  21  27  28  28  18  18 
 
(b) Welfare Reduction Indexes 
   1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04 
                   
Argentina  32  30  28  27  24  19  10  8  17 
Brazil  na  16  43  36  42  39  34  8  7 
Chile  53  27  28  28  16  34  23  18  13 
Colombia  28  23  22  26  40  25  25  35  58 
Dominican 
Republic  78  42  44  46  50  55  89  48  59 
Ecuador  na  37  48  59  71  44  20  24  32 
Mexico  na  na  na  43  48  42  54  30  33 
Nicaragua  na  na  na  na  na  na  29  31  26 
                   
Latin America  42  25  38  36  44  39  42  20  23 
Africa  52  52  52  49  51  81  52  37  36 
Asia  27  44  39  42  48  46  28  19  16 
Developing 
countries  44  44  42  42  48  48  32  19  18 
High-income 
countries  49  48  46  64  69  71  52  38  38 
Source: Anderson and Croser (2009), based on product NRAs and CTEs in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
a Regional aggregates are weighted using the average of the value of production and the value of consumption at 






























Subsidy  Tariff  Tariff 
                   
Argentina  0.0  -20.9  0.0  15.8    0.0  -14.8  0.0  5.8 
Brazil  5.0  -17.1  3.2  33.4    0.0  0.0  4.8  8.9 
Chile  -3.0  0.0  4.8  6.2    0.0  0.0  2.4  1.8 
Colombia  -0.6  1.0  21.7  22.8    0.0  0.0  21.6  9.8 
Ecuador  0.0  -13.7  28.6  10.3    0.0  0.0  13.4  10.4 
Mexico  14.3  -9.6  19.1  6.8    1.2  0.0  6.2  3.4 
Nicaragua  0.0  -2.8  10.9  3.9    0.0  -2.8  9.6  3.9 
Rest of Latin America  -1.7  0.3  9.9  9.9    -1.7  0.3  9.9  9.9 
                   
All developing countries   -0.6  -11.0  16.4  25.6    1.4  0.0  21.8  7.5 
  Africa  -0.3  -2.5  17.0  12.6    -0.8  0.1  20.4  11.2 
  East Asia   -5.6  -21.5  24.3  29.6    -0.3  0.0  41.6  6.7 
  South Asia   3.5  -7.1  10.7  72.6    7.2  1.7  6.9  20.2 
  Latin America  3.8  -9.6  9.8  15.7    -0.2  -1.4  7.2  6.7 
  Middle East  -12.4  0.0  7.5  5.7    -12.4  0.0  7.5  5.7 
  E. Europe and C. Asia  0.8  -2.6  13.8  9.6    0.8  -0.3  15.9  4.8 
High-income countries  6.6  20.9  24.0  2.4    2.6  7.2  22.3  1.2 
WORLD TOTAL  2.3  4.7  20.1  10.1    1.9  3.5  22.1  3.3 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 




Table 7  
Economic welfare impact of going back to 1980-1984 policies,  
and full liberalization of global merchandise trade, by country/region, 2004 
(relative to the 2004 benchmark data, in 2004 US dollars and percent) 
 
Going back to 1980-84 price 
distortions in 2004 
Full liberalization of 










































                 
Argentina  -1.7  0.1  -1.4  (0.1)  3.2  -0.7  2.6  (-0.6) 
Brazil  -5.3  6.8  -1.2  (1.6)  6.8  5.6  1.6  (1.3) 
Chile  0.1  0.7  0.1  (1.0)  0.3  0.2  0.4  (0.3) 
Colombia  2.5  2.5  3.5  (3.5)  2.2  0.7  3.1  (1.0) 
Ecuador  -0.6  0.3  -2.5  (1.2)  2.0  1.1  8.2  (4.4) 
Mexico  -2.6  3.6  -0.5  (0.7)  -0.7  -3.4  -0.1  (-0.6) 
Nicaragua  0.0  0.0  0.6  (0.0)  0.0  0.0  1.3  (0.4) 
Rest of Latin America  0.5  -0.2  0.1  (-0.1)  2.0  -1.0  0.5  (-0.3) 
                 
All developing countries  -73.1  49.3  -1.0  (0.7)  64.9  -12.2  0.9  (-0.2) 
North Africa  0.6  0.1  0.3  (0.0)  0.9  -2.8  0.5  (-1.5) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -3.4  1.7  -1.0  (0.5)  0.0  -3.2  0.0  (-0.9) 
East Asia   -61.5  19.9  -2.2  (0.7)  30.1  -1.0  1.1  (0.0) 
South Asia  -10.8  6.5  -1.7  (1.0)  -0.4  -3.9  -0.1  (-0.6) 
Latin America   -7.1  13.7  -0.4  (0.8)  15.8  2.5  1.0  (0.2) 
Middle East  2.6  0.4  0.5  (0.1)  4.2  -0.2  0.8  (0.0) 
EEurope & Central Asia  6.5  7.1  0.5  (0.6)  14.2  -3.6  1.2  (-0.3) 
                 
High-income countries  -159.9  -50.8  -0.7  (-0.2)  102.8  11.3  0.5  (0.1) 
                 
World total  -233.0  -1.5  -0.8  (0.0)  167.7  -1.0  0.6  (0.0) 
Source: World Bank LINKAGE model simulations from Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugghe and Anderson (2009). 






Impact on shares of agricultural and food production exported, by country/region of going back to 1980-84 












       
Argentina  42.3  31.6  47.0 
Brazil  20.7  13.3  32.5 
Chile  37.6  34.7  40.0 
Colombia  13.6  32.0  29.0 
Ecuador  28.2  21.2  47.5 
Mexico  7.7  6.8  9.2 
Nicaragua  27.6  31.4  31.9 
Rest of LAC  14.6  15.0  26.8 
       
All developing countries  9.5  9.5  16.9 
North Africa  6.3  7.9  20.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa  13.8  13.5  19.3 
East Asia   8.4  7.7  15.1 
South Asia  3.7  2.4  7.5 
Latin America  18.1  16.3  28.2 
Middle East  7.4  14.2  17.2 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia  6.8  9.1  11.1 
       
High-income countries  13.0  15.9  14.1 
       
World total
a   11.4  13.1  15.4 
Source: World Bank LINKAGE model simulations from Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugghe and Anderson (2009). 




Impact on real international product prices of going back to 1980-84 policies and full liberalization  
of global merchandise trade 








     
Paddy rice  -11.6  6.6 
Wheat  -15.4  1.4 
Other grains  -27.5  2.7 
Oil seeds  -8.6  -2.4 
Sugar cane and beet  -0.5  -2.0 
Plant-based fibers  0.8  2.9 
Vegetables and fruits  2.8  1.8 
Other crops  2.6  1.0 
Cattle sheep etc  0.5  -1.1 
Other livestock  -2.0  -2.1 
Raw milk  0.4  -0.2 
Wool  -1.9  3.3 
Beef and sheep meat  -15.0  4.6 
Other meat products  -45.5  0.6 
Vegetable oils and fats  -1.4  -1.9 
Dairy products  -8.5  3.8 
Processed rice  0.6  2.9 
Refined sugar  -2.5  1.3 
Other food, bevs. and tobacco  0.1  -1.3 
Textile and wearing apparel  1.4  -1.2 
Other manufacturing  0.3  -0.2 
Merchandise trade  -1.2  -0.2 
Agriculture and food  -12.6  0.3 
   Primary agriculture  -5.9  0.9 
   Agric & lightly processed food  -17.6  1.3 
Source: World Bank LINKAGE model simulations from Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugghe and Anderson (2009). 






Impact on agricultural and food output and trade, by country/region of going back to 1980-1984  
policies and full liberalization of global merchandise trade 
(relative to benchmark data, percent) 
 
  
Going back to 1980-1984 
policies  Full liberalization 
   Output  Exports  Imports  Output  Exports  Imports 
             
Argentina  -19.9  -36.7  27.8  37.8  95.6  81.8 
Brazil  -18.2  -48.5  30.7  45.3  100.7  94.8 
Chile  -11.0  -7.8  12.7  4.7  11.3  15.8 
Colombia  48.6  292.6  110.4  14.6  161.4  81.7 
Ecuador  -15.6  -69.6  -12.7  46.1  198.7  71.8 
Mexico  -2.3  -54.0  12.6  -0.4  5.8  4.3 
Nicaragua  2.8  26.1  16.8  2.9  21.6  19.4 
Rest of Latin America  -4.6  -0.2  32.2  25.7  175.9  30.4 
             
All developing countries  -3.2  4.9  50.3  7.1  100.0  40.4 
North Africa  -0.7  35.2  21.4  17.3  377.2  62.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa  4.3  15.5  50.0  1.9  41.9  32.3 
East Asia   -5.4  -0.2  51.2  4.0  77.4  37.4 
South Asia  -2.8  -41.2  12.3  0.0  108.3  33.2 
Latin America   -6.9  -20.6  26.8  26.8  106.4  29.8 
Middle East  7.1  154.2  58.6  21.5  222.7  12.1 
EEurope & Central Asia  -2.6  53.4  91.6  -2.6  79.7  77.6 
             
High-income countries  11.0  110.8  78.3  -13.1  -4.0  38.3 
             
World total
a  3.6  66.9  66.9  -2.6  39.1  39.1 
Source: World Bank LINKAGE model simulations from Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugghe and Anderson (2009). 






Impact on sectoral value added, agricultural and all-sector policy changes of going back to 1980-1984 policies 
and full liberalization of global merchandise trade 
(relative to 2004 benchmark data, percent) 
 
  
Going back to 1980-84 policies  Full liberalization 
Agric  Non-agric  Agric  Non-agric 
           
Argentina  -25.5  13.1  103.5  13.8 
Brazil  -24.9  1.6  42.6  4.2 
Chile  -1.8  1.3  5.5  0.9 
Colombia  13.6  15.3  53.5  1.5 
Ecuador  -35.4  -1.9  126.0  6.7 
Mexico  -4.0  1.8  0.3  -1.0 
Nicaragua  5.1  -0.4  2.4  2.3 
Rest of Latin America  0.0  -0.2  28.7  -0.6 
         
Developing countries  -4.9  -0.4  5.6  1.9 
North Africa  -0.3  0.3  -1.1  0.8 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -3.1  -0.3  -0.8  -0.5 
East Asia   -8.9  -2.8  4.7  3.5 
South Asia  -2.2  2.7  -6.7  -0.3 
Latin America   -9.8  2.7  37.0  2.3 
Middle East  -1.1  -0.8  25.4  0.9 
EEurope & Central Asia  1.5  -0.1  -5.2  0.3 
         
High-income countries  36.2  -0.5  -14.7  0.1 
         
World total  8.8  -0.5  -1.2  0.5 





Impact of going back to 1980-84 policies of full global merchandise trade liberalization on real factor  
prices, by country/region
 a 
(relative to the benchmark data, percent) 
 














CPI  Food CPI 
              
Developing countries  -2.1  -1.7  -1.5  -4.1  1.0  0.4 
North Africa  0.3  0.1  -0.2  -1.1  0.3  -0.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.1  0.6  1.2  -1.5  -1.4  -3.1 
East Asia   -4.5  -3.7  -3.4  -6.2  0.7  1.9 
South Asia  -4.1  -4.7  -1.7  -6.6  5.4  4.7 
Latin America   0.0  -0.1  -0.2  -8.1  2.2  0.2 
Middle East  0.6  0.7  0.2  -4.3  -1.2  -3.9 
EEurope & Central Asia  0.2  -0.1  0.2  4.1  -0.2  -1.6 
High-income countries  0.4  -0.7  -0.4  102.1  -0.1  -1.2 


















CPI  Food CPI 
              
Developing countries  3.5  3.0  2.9  1.6  -0.9  -2.8 
North Africa  7.0  7.7  5.3  -0.5  -5.2  -7.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa  3.2  3.2  3.8  0.2  -3.8  -4.9 
East Asia   4.0  3.4  3.3  1.9  0.1  -2.7 
South Asia  -0.6  2.3  1.2  -6.2  -1.6  0.3 
Latin America   4.5  1.4  1.9  21.1  1.2  3.2 
Middle East  8.3  2.9  4.7  43.8  -3.3  -10.5 
EEurope & Central Asia  1.7  3.2  2.6  -4.5  -2.3  -4.5 
High-income countries  0.2  1.0  0.5  -17.9  -0.6  -3.6 
World total  0.9  1.3  1.2  -3.1  -0.7  -3.2 
Source: World Bank LINKAGE model simulations from Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugghe and Anderson (2009). 
a Nominal factor prices deflated by national aggregate consumer price index (CPI), column 5 
b The user cost of capital and land represents the subsidy inclusive rental cost. 
 